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Abstract Evolutionary theory has an unexpected applica-
tion in philosophy of mind, where it is used by the so-called
biosemantic program—also called the teleosemantic pro-
gram—to account for the representational capacities of
neural states and processes in a way that conforms to an
overarching scientific naturalism. Biosemantic theories
account for the representational capacities of neural states
and processes by appealing in particular to their evolution-
ary function, as that function is determined by a process of
natural selection. As a result, biosemantic theories have
distinct advantages over other theories of mental represen-
tation—e.g., Fodor’s causal theory. Foremost among the
advantages of biosemantic theories is their ability to
account for the possibility of mental misrepresentation.
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Introduction
Resistance to viewing human beings through the lens of
evolutionary theory has many sources, not least of which is
the fact that eugenics, poverty, and other systematic
injustices have been perpetuated by the inchoate idea that
the fittest survive in competition. Since both theorists and
the wider public are prone to misuse evolutionary concepts
and principles to such ends, it is reasonable to think either
that extreme care must be exercised if evolutionary theory
is used to illuminate any aspect of our humanity, or even to
think that evolutionary theory should be utterly off-limits as
we seek to understand ourselves. However, notice in this
case that the reason for resistance is not that the explanatory
tools that evolutionary theory provides are ill-fitted to the
explanatory task (as saws for hammering, perhaps) but
rather that the tools are dangerous. So understood, this first
objection—call it the “moral objection”—does not deny the
explanatory adequacy of evolutionary concepts and princi-
ples themselves; and it is consistent with the moral
objection to think that these tools are exactly correct for
the explanatory task. Even so, the moral objection
reasonably implores us to resist using them.
However, it is a separable objection that most concerns
us here. The “explanation objection” does deny the
explanatory adequacy of evolutionary theory; in particular,
it denies the adequacy of evolutionary explanations of
human choice-making, of human thought and behavior. A
couple of reasons are typically given in support of the claim
that these phenomena are beyond evolutionary explanation.
First, there is the claim that contemporary technologies and
modern institutions have rendered selection in the human
realm artificial rather than natural, or cultural rather than
biological, a claim not unrelated to the idea that selectively
breeding dogs, horses, and livestock nullifies evolutionary
accounts of pertinent traits. So, although there may have
been a time when evolutionary accounts of human choice-
making, thought, and behavior—and perhaps other traits—
were explanatorily adequate, that time has long since
passed.
Second, there is the distinct yet compatible claim that
humans possess some special attribute, whether free will or
reason or other, that is essential to our very nature and is
itself sufficient to place us outside the scope of evolutionary
theory. If humans possess the attribute essentially, then
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human exceptionality is nothing new and did not need to
wait on the emergence of any technologies, even if
technologies now amplify that exceptionality. Despite the
difference between this claim and the first, both (if true) are
reasons for denying the adequacy of evolutionary explan-
ations of thought and behavior at the present time. And
what often goes hand in hand with the explanation
objection, in either form, is the view that the sciences more
generally are inadequate to the task of predicting, explain-
ing, or otherwise accounting for the mental life of present-
day human beings.
It is in the face of both the moral objection and the
explanation objection, then, that the work of Dawkins
(1976), Wilson (1978), Pinker (1997), and others persists.
The twin research programs that their work represents—
evolutionary psychology and sociobiology—aim precisely
to use the principles and concepts of evolutionary theory to
account for human thought and behavior.1 To the extent that
these programs affirm the adequacy of such explanations,
they build the case for what is sometimes called scientific
naturalism. Though this variety of naturalism has several
dimensions, it is adequate for our purposes to define
scientific naturalism as the thesis that the best empirical
science(s) can in principle explain everything–including
the gamut of human phenomena–even if that best science
will not be available until physicists finally hit upon their
long-sought “theory of everything.” Indeed, it is only
against the background of the conflict between scientific
naturalism and exceptionalism, ultimately a deep philosophic
conflict about the place of human beings in the world, that
the full significance of the biosemantic program—our
present topic—can be appreciated.
Like both sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, the
biosemantic program generates evolutionary explanations
of aspects of human thought and behavior. However, the
claims made by the biosemantic program are more specific
than the claims made by these other programs. Tucked
away within the philosophy of mind, the biosemantic
program typically uses evolutionary theory to account for
only our most basic and primitive thoughts, and to account
for only a certain feature of these thoughts, at that: their
capacity for representation.2 (Much more will be said about
the representational aspect of thoughts in what follows.) So
while the biosemantic program insists that science (biology)
has a crucial role to play in explaining an aspect of thought
and thereby helps to build the case for scientific naturalism,
it is also comparatively modest. As a result, the biosemantic
program is one that both naturalists and exceptionalists
might agree upon: though the biosemantic program builds
the case for scientific naturalism by enlarging the scope of
scientifically explicable phenomena, it also leaves much
untouched. For this reason and because the biosemantic
program—hereafter, simply biosemantics—is an unexpect-
ed and fascinating extension of evolutionary biology to a
longstanding problem in philosophy of mind, it merits a
close look.
What follows is something of a biosemantics tutorial. As
a result, fine distinctions between its varieties are passed
over as are other complexities that may be of interest to
some readers (readers who may wish to consult the works
cited). Also, biosemantics is just one of a number of related
philosophic programs that endeavor to use scientific
concepts and principles to explain the representational
aspect of thought. Alternative accounts might aim to
account for the representational aspect of thought by
invoking only such concepts and principles as are afforded
by physics (e.g., cause and effect) without making use of
the additional higher-level concepts and principles that
are afforded by biology (e.g., trait, selection, fitness, and
so forth). So just one approach to understanding the
phenomenon of representational thought is developed here,
an approach that is typically—though not necessarily—
motivated by an overarching scientific naturalism and that
is distinguished from other such approaches by its
ingenious appeal to the concepts and principles supplied
by evolutionary biology.
I have only gestured at the significance of the represen-
tational aspect of thought. The first section below says
more about what this representational aspect is and
explains why this aspect presents an especial philosophic
problem. The biosemantic solution to this problem, as that
solution is articulated by a celebrated proponent, Millikan
(1984, 1993), is presented in the second section. The third
highlights the distinctive strengths of biosemantic theories
of representation and points to correlative weaknesses in
chief alternatives: causal theories and resemblance theories.
The fourth and final section identifies ongoing challenges
for the program.
The Problem of Mental Representation
June wants an apple. Mark believes that the tide is receding.
Isabel imagines green pastures. Though their respective
mental states—desiring, believing, and imagining—are of
an everyday sort, each has an aspect that seems puzzling on
closer inspection. Their respective mental states represent
some state or feature of the world, which is also to say that
1 Perhaps the most controversial thesis to come out of these programs
is the thesis that it is more natural, a la biology, for stepfathers to
abuse their stepchildren than their genetic children on account of
selection pressures that weighed on our Pleistocene ancestors.
2 Here and throughout, the term thought is used in its wide sense, to
refer to mental states and processes that represent. Thoughts here
include perceptions and exclude sensations insofar as they are non-
representational.
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there is something that each of them is thinking about,
whether apples or tides or pastures. Though an everyday
phenomenon, the fact that our mental states have this
representational aspect can seem so puzzling that some
philosophers of mind see it as a problem: the problem of
mental representation or, simply, the “representation prob-
lem.” Of course, the representation problem is not a
problem in the sense that the existence of thoughts that
are about things is at all in doubt; after all, few things are
more familiar than our ability to think about things. Rather,
the representation problem poses a problem insofar as this
distinctive feature of our mental states—i.e., the fact that
they are about things—threatens to undermine scientific
naturalism. In other words, it is scientific naturalists and
scientifically naturalistic philosophers of mind who are
most inclined to see this representational aspect of thought
as a problem, and who are especially concerned to solve
that problem.3
Seeing just why the very existence of thoughts that
represent things might present a threat to scientific
naturalism requires little more than comparing thoughts
with paradigm physical objects: stones, molecules, and the
like. Though these objects do not think, it is more to the
present point that paradigm physical objects do not as such
represent anything. Since our thoughts—our neural states,
arguably—are about things, thoughts can readily seem
categorically distinct from paradigm physical phenomena.
By being about specific items in the world and by being
directed toward those items, our thoughts display a striking
power to “reach outside” and somehow point beyond
themselves toward those things, a power that may seem
strange in comparison to paradigm physical powers (Crane
1995). Again, stones, molecules, and other physical objects
do not seem to have this power.
Moreover, this peculiar representational power seems to
effect an equally peculiar relationship between the thoughts
and what they are about, a relationship (again) that seems
quite unlike the kinds of relationships that paradigm
physical objects have to one another. To wit, the kinds of
relations that obtain between physical objects—e.g., on top
of or next to or underneath—are typically sensitive to the
time or the location of the physical relata. For instance, one
stone cannot be on top of another stone unless the two
stones exist at the same time, and a cause cannot bring
about its effect unless the two are proximate. By contrast, a
thinker’s ability to stand in the (say) thinking-about relation
to some object or event seems relatively insensitive to its
time or location. It requires no more effort to have a thought
about the past or about the future than it does to have a
thought about the present, and no more effort to have a
thought about a distant friend than a neighbor. Indeed, one
often hears the opposite: that it is more difficult to think
about what is present and near than to think about what is
far. More striking on this score, however, is the observation
that we have little trouble thinking about things that do not
even exist—world peace, for instance—and it is difficult to
understand how a relationship to something that does not
even exist could be a relationship of the same kind as exists
between physical objects. For these reasons and still others,
the relationship between thoughts and what those thoughts
are about gives the appearance of being other-than-physical
and consequently of being beyond the explanatory scope of
any empirical, physical science.4
Indeed, many thinkers—historically, Brentano (1995/
1874)—have concluded that the representational aspect or
aboutness of thoughts is itself sufficient evidence against a
comprehensive scientific naturalism. For the naturalist to
meet Brentano’s challenge, she must show that this peculiar
aspect of thought is not so puzzling after all. She must show
that the relation between thoughts and what they are about
is ultimately a physical relationship like others, despite
appearances to the contrary. Before turning to the bio-
semantic response to the challenge, it is important to
consider one popular response, one that denies the need
for a response.
Though not ultimately successful, a first and plausible
reply to the representation problem is to deny that mental
representation is a problem for an overarching naturalism
on the grounds that representational capacities are to be
found throughout the natural, physical world. For instance,
it is argued, a pile of stones might signal a mountain
summit, and physical patterns of ink (words) on a page can
be about (many) things. Since not only thoughts but
everyday physical objects are quite capable of representing
things, the fact that our thoughts manage to be about things
need not cause any particular puzzlement. Again, if a pile
of stones can point beyond itself to particular objects or
features in the world then a thought’s ability to do so does
not pose a threat to naturalism. In short, there is no
representation problem.
This “no-response response” to the mental representation
problem is unsatisfactory. Seeing why sharpens the puzzle.
Consider Grice’s (1989) distinction between, on the one
hand, the way stones and ink represent features of the world
and, on the other hand, the way our thoughts do. If a pile of
stones manages to represent a mountain summit, it is
arguably because we have made it do so; and if ink patterns
3 Although, as I have suggested above, exceptionalists need not resist
a scientific account of this aspect of our thoughts, it may be that we
are exceptional for some other reason.
4 Strictly speaking, it could turn out that our best empirical science is
not physical. This would happen if empirical methods led us to
conclude that physics is inadequate. However, it is hard to imagine
that physics would not evolve with new empirical discoveries.
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manage to mean something, it is arguably because we have
somehow made them. Would they mean what they do—or
mean anything—without us? As Wittgenstein observed,
albeit to a different end, “each sign by itself seems dead”
(Wittgenstein 1953). According to the Gricean, the seman-
tic life stones and ink occasionally enjoy is one our
thoughts and activities breathe into them, and their specific
meanings are a function of which specific thoughts we have
in our use of them. Notice that the same explanation cannot,
however, be given for the representational powers our
thoughts themselves have. The aboutness of thoughts
cannot be explained in this way, by appealing to our other
thoughts and intentions, without introducing a circularity
that ultimately leaves the aboutness of (some) thoughts
unexplained. A satisfactory explanation of the aboutness of
thought cannot also take it as primitive.
Responding to the representation problem by noting that
stones and ink are about things too, does nothing to lift the
mystery surrounding the fundamental sort of aboutness that
characterizes thought. Noting that stones and ink are about
things arguably achieves the opposite: the derivative
aboutness of stones and ink is revealed to be all the more
puzzling insofar as it is derived from the as yet unexplained
aboutness of thought. In any event, the aboutness of
thought remains puzzling and seemingly different in kind
than the derivative sort of aboutness we confer upon
physical objects.
The mental representation problem merits a genuine
response, and it merits a response whether one has
naturalistic aims or not. After all, there is this fundamental
question to be answered: exactly how does the aboutness of
thought fit into the natural physical world? Can science
explain it? What might an explanation look like? Again,
biosemantics and other naturalistic theories of mental
representation aim to show that the aboutness of thoughts
is ultimately nothing over and above phenomena that are
plainly naturalistic. They aim to show that the fundamental
aboutness of thought is, as Fodor (1987) cleverly put it,
“really something else”—viz., something patently naturalis-
tic—even if it requires some effort to see that this is the case.
A Biosemantic Solution
Again, biosemantic theories of mental representation are
distinguished from others by their mode of explanation:
they seek to naturalize the aboutness of thought by
appealing to the evolutionary, biological function of the
neural states and processes that realize these thoughts. This
is the strategy of David Papineau (1987) and of Millikan,
who offers an especially detailed account. The aboutness of
those neural states and processes that realize our thoughts is
accounted for as follows: what makes a neural phenomenon
represent some feature of the world is just that it is its
proper evolutionary function to coordinate the relevant
organism—us, in this case—with that feature of the world.
We will look more closely at the notion of a proper function
presently, but notice that a successful explanation of the
aboutness of thought in terms of evolutionary proper
functioning will constitute a naturalistic explanation only
if proper functions are themselves naturalistic phenomena.
The notion of an evolutionary proper function is
importantly different from the everyday notion of a
function, even though it is in some ways similar to it. The
proper function of a biological trait—whether structural,
behavioral, etc.—is not whatever that trait in fact does,
since it might very well malfunction; the proper function of
a biological trait is what that biological trait should or ought
to do in light of its selection history. It is the proper
function of a heart to pump blood (say) even if that heart
fails to pump blood or even if it does something else, even
something that happens to be useful to the organism. It is
the proper function of the heart to pump blood even if it is,
we might be tempted to say, functioning in a way that is
different than its function. In saying this, however, we are
simply using the notion of a function in two distinct ways:
descriptively and normatively. The biological notion of a
proper function is a decisively normative one since it
specifies what a trait ought to be doing and does not simply
describe what it actually does. We will soon see that the
normativity of the biological notion of a function makes it
an especially useful conceptual tool for the task of
naturalizing mental aboutness.
In light of the moral objection to evolutionary explan-
ations of human phenomena, it is worth noting that the
biological imperatives that proper functions articulate are
not thereby also moral or ethical imperatives, even if they
bear some significant relation to them. Although biological
imperatives may overlap with moral imperatives in some
cases—i.e., it may be ethically imperative to feed those for
whom it is biologically imperative that they eat—these
imperatives may also diverge, and perhaps do so most
obviously in the case of sexual reproduction. Though
human functioning leading to reproduction may be proper
in a biological sense, it may be quite improper in the other.
And it is for good reason that we are not in the habit of
holding hearts morally accountable for pumping blood,
even if it is biologically imperative that they do so. An
action (or thought) resulting from the proper functioning of
a biological trait is not thereby morally justified, a fact
tragically missed in the cultural uptake of evolutionary
theory.
Since biosemantics does aim to account for the about-
ness of thought in terms of the proper functioning of brain
states, it is incumbent upon biosemantics to show that the
notion of a proper function is itself suitably naturalistic.
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What makes it the case that the proper function of the heart
is to (say) pump blood? Demonstrating that the notion is a
suitable tool for the explanatory task requires showing that
a given trait’s proper function is wholly given by the
process of natural selection and that its specification does
not presuppose thought and interpretation (as above, on
pain of circularity). More specifically, proving that the
notion of a proper function is suitable requires showing that
a trait’s proper function is nothing more than an abstraction
over the evolutionary process, in the way that the average
temperature of a region is nothing more than an abstraction
over changing temperature. If the average temperature of a
region is nothing more than an abstraction over natural
phenomena, its value is independent of our calculations. If
the proper function of a trait can be shown to be nothing
more than an abstraction over evolutionary processes, the
naturalist will be able to rely upon the notion to do
naturalizing explanatory work.
Biosemantics offers this specification: the proper func-
tion of a trait is just whatever that trait did or brought about
that enabled the species to survive and reproduce, i.e.,
whatever it did in the past that contributed to species
fitness. It is just because the heart’s pumping blood
contributed to species fitness that pumping blood, and not
the other things hearts might conceivably or randomly do,
is their proper function. If, as this analysis urges, a proper
function is ultimately nothing more than an abstraction over
the naturally selective process, then the notion of a proper
function is demonstrably suitable for showing that yet other
phenomena—e.g., representational phenomena—are natu-
ral, too.
It is on the foundation of the thusly proven notion of a
proper function that biosemantic theories of mental repre-
sentation are constructed. Though the ultimate ambitions of
theories vary, all begin modestly by theorizing only the
most basic representational capacities of non-human organ-
isms. Consider Dretske’s (1994) example involving the
low-level representation that occurs in certain bacteria:
Some marine bacteria have internal magnets (called
magnetosomes) that function like compass needles,
aligning themselves (and, as a result, the bacteria)
parallel to the earth’s magnetic field. Since these
magnetic lines incline downwards (towards geomag-
netic north) in the northern hemisphere (upwards in
the southern hemisphere), bacteria in the northern
hemisphere, oriented by their internal magnetosomes,
propel themselves toward geomagnetic north.
It turns out that heading toward geomagnetic north
enables these bacteria to survive by directing them
downward and hence away from the oxygen-rich surface
water that is toxic for them. As Millikan (1993) sees it, the
proper function of the magnetosomes is to coordinate the
bacteria with (safe) oxygen-free water and for that same
reason, they may be said to represent oxygen-free water.
More generally, all it is for the inner state of an organism to
represent a feature of the environment is for that state to
have the proper function of coordinating the whole
organism with that feature. Nothing more. And, again,
whether the inner state of an organism does have the proper
function of coordinating an organism with this or that
particular feature of the environment (or some other) is
wholly determined by the selection history of the organism-
type, by the basis upon which ancestral organisms were
selected over other organisms of the same type.
In this way, the selection history of a species imposes
constraints on what its biological representations can
subsequently mean. For instance, the orientation of a
present-day marine bacterium’s magnetosome could not
now mean oxygen-free water unless ancestral bacteria were
selected because they had magnetosomes that coordinated
them with oxygen-free water. That is, in order for the
orientation of the magnetosome to now represent oxygen-
free water, it must be the case that other of the marine
bacteria failed to survive and reproduce because they
lacked magnetosomes that coordinated them with oxygen-
free water—a condition that would be satisfied if, for
instance, bacteria that lacked such magnetosomes veered
perilously off into toxic oxygen-rich water. In addition,
magnetosomes could not have been selected for coordinat-
ing the bacteria with oxygen-free water, in particular, unless
oxygen-free water actually existed in the ancestral environ-
ment. In sum, it is now the proper function of magneto-
somes to represent oxygen-free water only if (1) bacteria
with oxygen-free water-coordinating magnetosomes were
selected over bacteria without oxygen-free water-coordinating
magnetosomes and, what is presupposed by this, that (2)
there was actually oxygen-free water in the environment of
ancestral bacteria. Only because these two conditions were
met, the proper function of present-day magnetosomes is to
represent the direction of oxygen-free water even if they fail
to do so.
In this fashion, biosemantics provides a naturalistic
analysis of the representational capacities of very basic
biological structures. And since the low-level representa-
tional capacities of bacterial magnetosomes are not deriv-
ative in the way that the aboutness of non-biological stones
and words is—i.e., since it is plainly not anything we think
or do that makes magnetosomes represent what they do—
naturalizing the representational capacities of magneto-
somes is also naturalizing aboutness of the right general
kind. And, in the wake of Millikan’s analysis, the magneto-
some’s ability to represent features of the world is not so
mysterious-seeming. The hope of Millikan, Papineau, and
other biosemanticists is that shifting attention toward
representational phenomena in the biological domain—
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and away from representational phenomena in the non-
biological domain (stones and ink)—will make the thesis
that mental representation is naturalistic more plausible.
Of course, their hope is also to show that the
phenomenon of mental representation is naturalistic, and
in a similar way. If the evolutionary concepts and principles
can be used to explain aboutness, or even proto-aboutness,
at the basic biological level then there is reason to think
they can be used to account for the aboutness of higher-
level neural phenomena. For instance, it is now open to the
biosemanticist to argue that neural states or processes in us
are about edges or food or danger just in virtue of the fact
that directing our ancestors toward or away from these
items conferred some selective advantage upon them.
A Strength of Biosemantics: Accommodating
the Possibility of Misrepresentation
Representations at any level are not always veridical,
accurate, correct, or true. The magnetosome may malfunc-
tion, causing the bacterium to stray into toxic water, and
thoughts are often false. Indeed, the phenomenon of
representation carries the possibility of misrepresentation
along with it. As a result, the biosemantic theory of
representation is only halfway there: any complete theory
of representation must account for the aboutness of those
many representations that are misrepresentations. As it
happens, accounting for the aboutness of misrepresenta-
tions is the most daunting task facing naturalistic theories of
representation.
Showing that error of any sort is a wholly natural
phenomenon is not easy. Error is not to be found either at
the sub-atomic level (muons and leptons do not make
mistakes), or at the chemical level (sulfuric acid does not
err). And if error does not “go that deep,” then it would
seem to follow that the phenomenon of representation
cannot go that deep either (Fodor 1987). Again: where
goes representation, there too goes the possibility of
misrepresentation. But the challenge misrepresentation
poses to scientific naturalism is even more daunting than
this. The depth of the sub-atomic and chemical levels is not
the only reason error cannot be located there. Medium-sized
and enormous physical objects—stones and planets—do
not make any mistakes either, even if we are guilty of
mistakes involving them.
Notice, however, that error of a kind seems to occur at
the biological level. The real ingenuity of the biosemantic
solution ultimately rests in its appeal to a naturalistic
domain that, although as natural as the domains of physics
and chemistry, nonetheless includes the possibility of a kind
of error. It is here that we find, as Dretske put it, “nature’s
way of making a mistake” (Dretske 1994): hearts and other
organs malfunction, magnetosomes lead bacteria into toxic
waters, and chameleons fail to change color. Things go awry.
The possibility of error at the biological level gives bio-
semantics a distinct advantage over its chief alternatives—
causal theories and resemblance theories—which do not
avail themselves of biological notions. Since these alterna-
tive theories of representation do not make use of the
phenomenon of biological error, they are especially hard-
pressed to account for the possibility of representational
errors, and hence to provide a full account of the phenom-
enon of mental representation.
Both resemblance and causal theories borrow on
common sense views about representation-in-general. To
wit, it seems as though paintings resemble what they
represent, and that what a photograph represents has
something to do with its causes: what makes this a photo
of Fido is that Fido was in front of the camera at the time
that the photo was taken. The resulting theories of
representation can be respectively cast as follows (follow-
ing Crane (1995), R stands for the representational state or
process of an organism type, O and C stands for the content
of the representation, i.e., what it is about):
R in O represents C if and only if R resembles C.
R in O represents C if and only if R is caused by C.
Although both resemblance theories and causal theories
begin with common sense views about how representations
manage to represent what they do, these theories do not and
cannot end there. For instance, it is imperative that a pure
resemblance theory of representation specify a relevant
mode of resemblance. After all, an organism’s representa-
tional state is not, as a simple theory suggests, about
absolutely everything that it resembles: magnetosomes are
needle-like but do not thereby represent needles. And there
are several respects in which a representation does not
resemble what it represents, for instance with respect to
color or shape: magnetosomes do not at all look like the
oxygen-free water that they nonetheless represent. Without
further qualification, then, simple resemblance is neither
sufficient nor necessary for representation.
For similar reasons, it is incumbent upon a pure causal
theory of representation to specify a relevant mode of
causation. Plainly, the representational state of an organism
is not, as a simple causal theory suggests, about all of its
causes: magnetosomes do not represent adjacent structures
within the marine bacteria, even though causally affected
by them. Nor does a representation always causally interact
with what it is about, for the plain reason that what a
representation represents may be absent or may not even
exist in individual cases. For instance, an individual
magnetosome may represent oxygen-free water even if
there is none in the vicinity, as when it malfunctions. And
when we make perceptual errors, as may well happen on a
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dark or foggy night, the meaning or content of our
representation is not what caused it, in all but the strangest
cases. For instance, if we mistake a skinny cow for a
normal-sized horse, the content or meaning of the repre-
sentation is “horse” even though it is caused by a (skinny)
cow. Without further qualification, then, it is clear that
being the cause of a representation is neither sufficient nor
necessary for being what the representation is about, as a
simple causal theory maintains.
Again, both resemblance and causal theories of repre-
sentation must specify the relevant modes of resemblance
and causation, both because resemblance-relations and
causal-relations are ubiquitous and because simple relations
usually fail to hold if an error has occurred, i.e., if those
representations are misrepresentations. Indeed, proponents
of both resemblance and causal theories have made some
progress in specifying those relevant modes. According to
an amended causal theory, for instance, a representation is
about its cause only if conditions are normal:
R in O represents C if and only if R is caused by C in
normal conditions.
Accordingly, the direction of the magnetosome represents
oxygen-free water only if the bacterium is in its normal marine
environments, and not if a bar magnet is waved above it or if it
is transported to the opposite hemisphere (where polarity is
reversed). An amended causal theory does not presume, then,
that the cause and the content of a representation will coincide
unless the environment in which the representing takes place
is normal or—as often put—ideal. In this way, the amended
causal theory proposes to distinguish between relevant (ideal)
and irrelevant (non-ideal) causes. And the amendment seems
to get the right result: the magnetosome does not represent
oxygen-rich water in an environment in which the local
polarity is reversed, even if it directs bacterium toward the
oxygen-rich water. Rather, the representational content is
determined by what the individual magnetosome would do in
the environment that is normal or ideal for it (even if it never
gets there).
Though it seems to get the right results, the amended
causal theory is hard-pressed to give a non-circular
specification of the normal or ideal conditions for repre-
sentation. Consider: is a dark night an ideal condition for
perception? It depends; dark nights may not be ideal for
seeing horses but they are ideal for seeing stars. If the
specification of ideal conditions ultimately depends on what
the perception is about (its content), as it seems, then the
specification also presupposes the very phenomenon it is
invoked to explain. At the same time, if the specification of
ideal conditions does not take the content of a representa-
tion into account—i.e., if it is insensitive to what the
representation is about—then it seems doomed to fail. If
daytime is ideal then veridical star-perceptions will thereby
be ruled out; if the nighttime is ideal then all representations
caused by skinny cows at night will thereby represent
skinny cows, and ordinary perceptual mistakes will be ruled
out. The results are unacceptable, yet naturalism prohibits
the amended theory from presupposing aboutness in its
specification of ideal conditions; and to do so would be to
presuppose the very aboutness that the theory sets out to
explain. In the end, then, even an amended causal theory
falters in the face of misrepresentation.
Amended resemblance theories are similarly susceptible
to the special problem misrepresentation poses, but it is
not necessary to see how all of that goes in order to
appreciate the difficulty of the challenge. Naturalistic
theories struggle to explain the aboutness of misrepre-
sentations in particular, because the usual coordination and
correlation between an organism and its environment, or
between a perceiver and her world, is often disrupted
when error and misrepresentation occur. Many of the
simple relationships that obtain between a veridical
representation and what it represents fail when misrepre-
sentation occurs and unusual relationships take their place.
Nonetheless, a successful naturalistic theory of represen-
tation must identify a relationship that does not change, a
single naturalistic relationship that holds between a
representation and what it represents whether the repre-
sentation is veridical or non-veridical, whether it is a
representation or a misrepresentation.
Biosemantic theories are remarkably well poised to
accommodate misrepresentation. In virtue of their distinctive
appeal to evolution, they seem to do this without inadver-
tently presupposing content or aboutness. Again, Millikan’s
particular version of the theory is that the bacteria’s
magnetosome represents oxygen-free water if and only if it
is the function of the magnetosome to coordinate the bacteria
with oxygen-free water. Leading the bacteria toward toxic,
oxygen-rich water would not constitute successful coordina-
tion. Consequently, it would constitute misrepresentation.
Misrepresentation is simply a species of malfunction.
A recap: for it to be the case that this individual magneto-
some has the proper function of coordinating this individual
bacterium with oxygen-free water is just for it to be the case
that being so coordinated with oxygen-free water contributed
to the biological fitness of ancestor bacteria, i.e., that at some
point in the evolutionary history of the bacteria, those that had
magnetosomes that played this role were (naturally) selected
over those that did not—a process that explains the persistence
of the trait in descendent bacteria. According to Millikan and
others, all of these episodes, events, and sequences in the
organism’s past are what make this present fact true: the
orientation of this individual magnetosome now represents
the direction of oxygen-free water. Likewise, all of these
episodes, events, and sequences in the organism’s past are also
what make it true that the magnetosome misrepresents the
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location of oxygen-free water if it orients the bacteria toward
toxic surface water.
Through the biosemantic program and, in particular, by
enabling the program to link the phenomenon of misrepre-
sentation to the phenomenon of biological malfunction,
evolutionary theory has made a surprising and significant
contribution to the project of showing how the phenomenon
of representation might fit into the natural world. In doing
so, it has brought us a step closer to understanding how the
phenomenon of mental representation might fit there, too.
Perhaps neural structures and processes, too, have been
naturally selected for representing particular features of the
world. Biosemantics makes it conceivable.
Ongoing Challenges
However, the program is not without its challenges, three of
which are mentioned here. A fuller treatment of them can
be found in the works cited.
“The past is never dead,” Faulkner (1975) once wrote,
“In fact, it is not even past.” Although the biosemanticist
would not assent to the bare assertion that the past is the
present—nor is Faulkner likely to have done so—she
agrees that (selection) history determines what present
representational structures and processes are about, just as
it determines the present function of non-representational
structures and processes (hearts). A consequence of this
theory—one which offends the sensibilities of Davidson
(1987) and others—is that if a bacterium were to come into
existence spontaneously, its magnetosome would have no
function and would not represent anything at all. Similarly,
if a humanlike being were to pop into existence, and with a
brain and neural firings physically identical to any of ours,
it is a consequence of biosemantics that the being’s brain
and neural firings would have no function and not be about
anything at all. No history, no function; no function, no
representation. Now, whether this ultimately constitutes an
objection to biosemantics depends on whether that result is
acceptable, and this is not clear to many.
However, it is clearly an objection to biosemantics to
argue that its appeal to history rules out the possibility of
thoughts about telephones or computers, not to mention
thoughts about things that do not yet exist. Plainly, we do
think about such things, even though being coordinated with
telephones and computers (say) did not confer any selective
advantage on our Pleistocene ancestors. Millikan’s reply to
the objection is resourceful; she argues that it is the proper
function of some set of neural firings to coordinate us with
these modern items for the same reason it is the proper
function of some device in a chameleon to coordinate it with
a color even if its ancestors never encountered that specific
color before. She argues (Millikan 1994a):
The brain structures we have recently been using in
developing space technology and elementary particle
physics have been operating in accordance with the
very same general principles as when prehistoric man
used them for more primitive ventures. They are no
more performing new and different functions or
operating in accordance with new and different
principles nowadays than are the eyes when what
they see is television screens and space shuttles.
The same may be true of structures and processes which
enable us to entertain thoughts about televisions and space
shuttles. According to Millikan, what occurs in such cases is
merely a novel application of an old rule or principle which,
when followed by particular neural structures and mecha-
nisms in the ancestral past, led to their selection. In the
chameleon case, that rule is: turn the color of the surrounding
surface, whatever that is; and since the device observed the
rule, the chameleon was coordinated with its environment,
and the device persisted in descendant chameleons. Of course,
if Millikan is to avoid the charge of being ad hoc in her reply
to this objection, she must also make sure that the rules
instantiated by our biology limit our representational capac-
ities. (Rules which allow everything are not rules.)
A final objection is that biosemantics is constructed
upon a foundation that proves unstable on close inspection:
the notion of a proper function. Arguably, the notion of a
proper function is neither clear nor determinate. Take the
magnetosome case. Millikan’s position is unequivocal: the
magnetosome represents oxygen-free water since being
coordinated with oxygen-free water contributed to species
fitness. However, Millikan’s ruling is not decisive. In fact,
there is serious disagreement over how the function of the
magnetosome should be specified. Imagine again that an
unsuspecting bacterium from the Northern Hemisphere is
transported to the Southern Hemisphere or (again) depos-
ited into a Petri dish over which magnets are passed. The
magnetosome will probably not lead the bacterium to
oxygen-free water in these situations and may even lead
the bacterium straight to its destruction. According to
Millikan, the magnetosome would thereby malfunction.
But surely, some theorists contend, we should hesitate
before concluding that the magnetosome has malfunctioned
here. Surely it would be unfair to expect the magnetosome
to point the bacterium in the direction of oxygen-free water
in these strange situations.5 If this is correct, then the proper
function of the magnetosome is simply to coordinate the
bacterium with magnetic north, wherever that should lead,
and not to coordinate the bacterium with oxygen-free water.
5 Although, again, moral notions of responsibility do not apply at this
level, they do effectively highlight the difficulty of specifying the
proper function of a biological representation and, hence, what it is
really about.
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On the other hand, and as tempting as it may be to narrow
the function of the magnetosome down to just coordinating
the bacterium with magnetic north, the reason why the
magnetosome has persisted clearly includes its capacity for
coordinating the bacteria with more distal features of the
environment. Neither the bacteria nor the magnetosome
would have survived if the direction of magnetic north had
also been the direction of toxic water, for instance, so it is not
just pointing the bacteria toward magnetic north that explains
the persistence of the bacteria and its magnetosomes, a fact
of which Millikan is keenly aware.
Narrowing the proper function too drastically may let the
magnetosome off the hook in every case; that is, it may be
near-impossible for all but the most deformed magneto-
some not to point the bacteria toward magnetic north. More
generally, if the proper functions of representing traits are
too narrowly specified, their specification will not allow for
the possibility of misrepresentation, which would undercut
the most theoretically attractive feature of the biosemantic
account. In short, it is incumbent upon a successful
biosemantics to specify proper functions in a principled
way and in a way that is neither too broad nor too narrow,
neither too demanding nor too lax. The specification must
be broad enough to allow for the possibility of misrepre-
sentation and yet narrow enough to ensure a degree of
representational success sufficient for explaining the per-
sistence of the representing trait. Executing this balancing
act is just one item on the biosemantic agenda, one taken up
by Neander (1995, 1991) and Sober (1993, 1984), among
others.
These three challenges face any biosemantic theory of
representation; which additional challenges arise depends on
the specific ambitions of individual theories. Using the
evolutionary past to account for the aboutness of complex
human thoughts, as Millikan and Papineau ultimately aim to
do, is the most ambitious goal to which biosemantics ever
aspires, while a most modest biosemantics denies that there is
any fruitful continuity between low-level biological represen-
tation (about which it has much to say) and human thoughts
(about which it will say nothing). Though an ambitious
biosemantics faces additional challenges, the committed
naturalist may find these worth confronting: since the
biosemantic solution to the problem of mental representation
is arguably the most promising naturalistic solution available,
thoughts that elude biosemantic explanation are thoughts that
may well elude naturalistic explanation altogether. Clearly, a
theorist who is willing to let the thesis of human exception-
alism stand will not be similarly motivated.
But it would be an easy mistake to conclude that a most
modest biosemantics is more correct simply for its modesty:
to deny that there is any fruitful continuity between low-
level biological representations and human thought is
arguably as implausible as the naïve adaptationism that
often characterizes the programs of sociobiology and
evolutionary psychology. After all, a theory may be just
as incorrect by being too modest in its claims as by being
too bold. Millikan (1994) insists, “To suspect that the brain
has not been preserved for thinking with or that the eye has
not been preserved for seeing with—to suspect this,
moreover, in the absence of any alternative hypotheses
about causes of the stability of these structures—would be
totally irresponsible.” Admitting that brains have been
selected for thinking is admitting that thinking is their
proper function and allowing that, on occasion, it may be
their proper function to think useful and perhaps even
correct thoughts. If so, there is good reason to believe that
the representational aspect of human thought can in some
part be explained by evolution, if not just yet.
Yet even Millikan (1994), whose program is most
ambitious of all, denies that “bacteria and paramecia, or
even birds and bees, have inner representations in the same
sense that we do.” Though the bacterium’s magnetosome
enables it to represent, the bacterium does not thereby
perceive or think. There are significant differences between
low-level biological representations and human thoughts.
Still, Millikan argues that the sense in which we have
(mental) representations is explicable in terms of lower-level
representations plus other explicable features—e.g., non-self-
representing elements, storage, etc. Millikan argues that the
additional features that distinguish thoughts and other mental
representations from low-level biological representations are
also perfectly amenable to evolutionary explanation. How-
ever, it would be sufficient for the purposes of an overall
naturalism if these supplementary features were amenable to
any naturalistic explanation, whether evolutionary, chemical,
physical, or other. But Millikan’s chief claim here is, again,
that mental representations are continuous with basic
biological representations. If we can explain how magneto-
somes represent and misrepresent, then we will be that much
closer to explaining how our thoughts represent and
misrepresent, and that much closer to understanding how
the aboutness of June’s desire for an apple, Mark’s belief
about the tide, and Isabel’s imaginings is possible in a natural
world. And we will perhaps be that much closer to knowing
if and even just when these mental states occur.
Conclusion
Philosophers have long labored to understand the place of
humans and minds in the natural world. It is a surprise to
many that the theory of evolution, an ostensibly biological
theory, is responsible for much of the progress that has been
made on this perennial philosophic problem. In the hands
of the biosemanticist, the theory of evolution offers us a
way to understand what it is that makes one part of the
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world about another part of the world. It begins to explain
how neural firings might come to represent something, and
to represent one thing rather than some other. Perhaps, the
program suggests, for neural firings to represent something
is simply for them to have been naturally selected for
coordinating an organism—perhaps us—with that some-
thing. In this way, biosemantics begins to show how the
norms of representation and mind could ultimately derive
from natural, biological facts.
As a way to understand how low-level biological
representations represent, and what they represent, the
biosemantic strategy is promising. The challenges that face
it do not seem insurmountable, and Neander (1995, 1991),
in particular, has made great strides in addressing and
managing the worry that proper functions are indetermi-
nate. Even as a method for understanding how simple and
primitive perceptual representations in non-human organ-
isms, and even humans, manage to represent, biosemantics
offers compelling solutions. Even if biosemantics cannot
explain our ability to represent such novelties as televisions
and space shuttles, it is plausible to think that more
primitive representational abilities have been, as it were,
seared into our brains: the ability to represent precipices,
food, predators, and the like. Its prospects for explaining
higher level and higher order thought are less certain, but
few programs aim this high.
In the end, the success of biosemantics as a theory of
mental representation may depend on the extent to which the
theory can be confirmed by empirical research. Though
biosemantics outlines an ingenious strategy for the naturali-
zation of the representational capacities of non-human and
human organisms, its success as an account of mental
representation may ultimately require showing that neural
states and processes were indeed selected for thinking, as
Millikan reasonably suggests, and that thinking—and think-
ing particular thoughts—is not simply a by-product of some
more crucial function. In this respect, the biosemantic
program waits on the collaboration of empirical researchers.
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